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The present paper investigates a standard model of endogenous fertility when child survival to adulthood 
is  uncertain.  In  this  framework,  I  first  show  that  facing  the  risk  their  children  die  before  reaching 
adulthood, parents don’t always formulate a precautionary demand for children. Indeed, there exists a 
non-empty set of utility functions for which parents undershoot their number of children rather than 
overshooting  it.  Second,  the  properties  of  the  optimal  economic  policy  will  crucially  depend  on  the 
manner the Social Welfare Function takes uncertainty into account. More precisely, if Social Welfare is 
evaluated after the resolution of uncertainty, the parental response to uncertainty is a source of social 
inefficiency. Then, individual decisions have to be corrected through tax or transfer on both births and 
education. This property becomes crucial to determine the optimal public response to a mortality crisis in 
presence of positive externalities on education. 
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author. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the funding contributions of Eckstein and Wolpin [1985] and Nerlove et al [1986], a
large economic literature explores the optimality of fertility behaviors. The present paper
studies the optimality conditions in a standard model of endogenous fertility when child
survival to adulthood is uncertain. In this framework, I show two important results. First,
facing the risk their children die before reaching adulthood, parents don’t always formulate
ap r e c a u t i o n a r yd e m a n df o rc h i l d r e n .S e c o n d ,t h ep r o p e r t i e so ft h eo p t i m a le c o n o m i cp o l i c y
will crucially depend on the manner the Social Welfare Function takes uncertainty into
account. More precisely, if the Social Planner isn’t purely utilitarist, the parental response
to uncertainty about child survival will have to be corrected by distortive taxes.
Assuming that child survival to adulthood is uncertain makes sense only if the young
adult mortality is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.1 This is the case for a large set of coun-
tries. For instance, Mesle and Shkolnikov [1996] show that the Russian mortality crisis has
dramatically increased the death rate among young adults. Baland and Estevan [2007] ﬁnd
that young adult mortality is signiﬁcantly positive for a larger range of countries including
for instance Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and Guatemala. A recent literature points out that the
AIDS epidemic has either increased or maintain young adult mortality rate at a high level.2
It implies that mortality among young adult is an important issue for individual fertility
decisions and therefore, for the nature of the optimal family policy in the economy.3
In the present paper, I use a "standard model of fertility". Since the fundamental con-
tributions of Becker [1973], Becker and Tomes [1976], Becker and Lewis [1973], Becker and
Barro [1988], Razin and Ben Zion [1975] and Galor and Weil [1999], the representation of
fertility behaviors admits a uniﬁed framework. This framework consists of two fundamental
assumptions. First, parents value the number of their children (their quantity) as well as
1.For the most developed countries, the young adult mortality isn’t very diﬀerent from zero (see for
instance Murray and Lopez [1997]). In this case, adopting a model without uncertainty does not consist
in a too strong approximation of reality especially emphasizing that, at the individual level, fertility is a
non-negative integer.
2.See for instance Boucekkine et al [2009], Buthelezi et al [2008], Feeney [2001] and Boerma et al [1998].
It is important to note that in the present paper, I don’t take into account the problem of orphans that is
directly connected to young adult mortality. I assume that young adults die before having any child.
3.The importance of young adult mortality for the explanation of fertility behaviors has been stressed,
for instance, by Erlich and Lui [1991], Cervellatti and Sunde [2007], Lagerlof [2003], Kalemli-Ozcan [2003]
and Belle and Gersbach [2009]. I only focus here on young adult mortality. Some papers speciﬁcally study
other dimensions of mortality. See for instance, Boucekkine et al. [2003,2009], Zhang and Zhang [2006] and
Cervellatti and Sunde [2009] who explore the impact of adult mortality or longevity on fertility decisions.
Another set of papers study the impact of child mortality on parental fertility. See for instance, Barro
and Becker [1988], Doepke [2005], Kalemli-Ozcan [2008], Strulik [2004] and Soares [2005]. Some papers like
Chakraborty [2004] make endogenous the evolution of mortality.
2their quality because they are altruistic toward their oﬀsprings. Second, whatever the form
of altruism that is assumed, parents maximize their expected utility subject to a non linear
budget constraint. Because quality is provided to each child, its cost crucially depends on
the quantity choices. Then the parental budget constraint is no longer linear and, a trade-oﬀ
between quality and quantity takes place.
Ia d o p th e r ea na s s u m p t i o no fp e r f e c ta l t r u i s ma si nR a z i na n dB e nZ i o n[ 1 9 7 5 ]s u c ht h a t
parental preferences are dynastic. In this framework, a particular form of additively separable
utility is assumed: the utility ﬂow coming from the quantity of children is separable from
the utility ﬂow coming from altruism (quality of children) while it is not always separable
from the utility ﬂow coming from consumption.4 Adopting this form of dynastic preferences
enables me to obtain tractable results.
In this framework, I assume that children die before reaching adulthood but after re-
ceiving education5 and I show two important results. First, facing uncertainty about the
number of their children who will survive to adulthood, parents do not always have a pre-
cautionary demand for children.6 Indeed, parents engage in insurance strategy (hoarding)
only when their utility loss coming from their risk aversion is reduced by an additional birth.
Is h o wt h a tan o n - e m p t ys e to fu t i l i t yf u n c t i o n sd o e sn o ts a t i s f yt h i sc o n d i t i o na n ds o ,p a r -
ents undershoot their number of children (they have less children than optimal in a certain
environment). For instance, at the steady state, parents have a precautionary demand for
children when their utility function is log-linear. However, they undershoot their number
of children when their utility function has a weak and constant elasticity of substitution
between consumption and the quantity of children.
This result consists in a non trivial generalization of Kalemli-Ozcan [2003] who also
4.A standard alternative consists in assuming a perfect altruism as in Barro and Becker [1988] where the
utility ﬂow coming from parental consumption is separable from the utility ﬂow coming from both quantity
and altruism which are not separable from each other. In fact, Nerlove and Rault [1997] show that these
two models are speciﬁc cases of a more general model where the utility ﬂows coming from consumption,
fertility and altruism are not separable. This general model is brieﬂy presented in section 2. In the context
of uncertain child survival, the Razin and Ben Zion’s model enables to use both standard approximation
methods of utility under uncertainty and the concepts of prudence a la Kimball [1990] and Leland [1968] since
fertility directly enters the instantaneous utility function. This is not the case for the Barro and Becker’s
model (see section 2). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the present model remains an
ad-hoc speciﬁcation of the most general endogenous fertility model what can drive some of my results.
5.A large set of papers also adopt this assumption, see, for instance, Cervellatti and Sunde [2007], Kalemli-
Ozcan [2003], Lagerlof [2003], Erlich and Lui [1991], Bell and Gersbach [2009]
6.In line with Kalemli-Ozcan [2003], parents have a precautionary demand for children if, facing the risk
that children die, they have more children than optimal in a certain environment. In other words, they
overshoot their optimal number of children in order to ensure that they won’t have less surviving children
than optimal.
3assumes that children die after receiving education from their parent.7 In her framework,
parents are characterized by log-linear preferences. Then, when the number of surviving
children is uncertain, parents always have a precautionary demand for children and never
undershoot their fertility rate. I show that this is not veriﬁed for any utility functions.8
The second main result of this paper comes from the determination of the optimal family
policy when child survival to adulthood in uncertain.9 Intuitively, because there is no ex-
ternality, if the social planner is purely utilitarist the competitive equilibrium coincides with
the ﬁrst best path. However, as shown by Gajdos and Maurin [2004], in presence of uncer-
tainty, the problem of the timing eﬀect arises: should Social Welfare be evaluated before or
after the resolution of uncertainty? Assuming a purely utilitarist social planner requires to
evaluate the social welfare before the resolution of uncertainty. The SWF is then ex-ante,
it equals the utility of the representative agent before the resolution of uncertainty. Despite
this assumption is consistent with the aggregation of utilities, another way to deﬁne the SWF
under uncertainty consists of the ex-post SWF. In this case, the social welfare is evaluated
after the resolution of uncertainty. Then the SWF equals the utility of the representative
agent after the resolution of uncertainty.10
Here, because the law of large number applies, the average number of surviving children
7.Assuming young adult mortality implies that parents cannot implement a replacement strategy. In
am o r er e c e n tp a p e r ,K a l e m l i - O z c a n[ 2 0 0 8 ]a s s u m e st h a tc h i l d r e nd i eb e f o r er e c e i v i n ge d u c a t i o nw h a ti s
compatible with the assumption of child mortality.
8.Kalemli-Ozcan [2003,2008] propose a model of long-run growth what requires to obtain closed-form
solutions. It prevents from obtaining more general conclusions on individual behaviors. It is also important
to note that she adopts an assumption of imperfect altruism (warm-glove motive) leading to non-dynastic
preferences. However, I show in section 2 that her results are valid in the dynastic framework of Razin and
Ben-Zion.
9.Eckstein and Wolpin [1985] and Nerlove et al [1986] are the ﬁrst paper to study the optimality conditions
in a model of trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity. Obviously, they don’t emphasize uncertain child
survival. In this paper, I will deal only with Millian type SWF, that is to say with maximizing the welfare
of the representative parent. See Nerlove et al [1986] and Baudin [2010] for an analysis of the Benthamite
case, and Spiegel [1993] who deal with Rawlsian SWF.
10.Gajdos and Maurin provide an interesting example to show why using both ex-ante and ex-post SWF
is very important to analyze the optimal equilibrium in an economy subject to uncertainty. They also quote
an enlightening sentence of Myerson [1981]:
"The moral of this story is that simply specifying a social welfare function may not be
enough to fully determine a procedure for collective decision making. One must also specify
when the individuals’ preferences or utility levels should be evaluated; before or after the
resolution of uncertainties. The timing of social welfare analysis may make a diﬀerence. The
timing-eﬀect is often an issue in moral debate, as when people argue about whether a social
system should be judged with respect to its actual income distribution or with respect to its
distribution of economic opportunities" (p. 884).
See also Sandmo [1983].
4is known with almost certainty at each period.11 This implies that the ex-post SWF consists
of the utility derived from the average number of surviving children at each date. Obviously,
adopting this representation of social preferences leads to diﬀerent results compared with
the ex-ante SWF. Indeed, in this case, the Social Planner can be viewed as risk neutral
since he maximizes the utility of the representative parent having the expected number of
children rather than the parental expected utility. It implies that the parental insurance
strategy against risk becomes a source of social ineﬃciency. Therefore, if parents overshoot
their optimal fertility rate, they have too much children and it is optimal to tax births.
Because the parental budget constraint isn’t linear, the tax on births increases the marginal
cost of human capital for future generations and so, it is optimal to subsidize education.
Conversely, if parents engage in undershooting, they don’t have enough oﬀspring at the
competitive equilibrium. Then, it is optimal to subsidize births and because the budget
constraint isn’t linear, it is also optimal to tax investments in education.
This result will become crucial once externalities are introduced in the model. Indeed, a
large set of papers assume that there exist positive externalities in the production of human
capital.12 Baudin [2010] shows that in presence of positive externalities in the production
of human capital, the optimal economic policy in a Millian economy consists of subsidizing
education and taxing births. This result crucially comes from both the Lucas-type exter-
nality and the non-linearity of the parental budget constraint. Because of the Lucas-type
externality, parents don’t take into account all the returns of their investment in their chil-
dren’s human capital. Therefore, they tend to underinvest in the quality of children such
that education spending has to be subsidized. However, the subsidy on education reduces
the marginal cost of the quantity of children. Then parents have too much children and
births have to be taxed.
Intuitively, the existence of uncertainty about child survival to adulthood could alter the
nature of the optimal economic policies as well as the optimal response to a mortality crisis.
Ip r o p o s ea ne x t e n s i o no ft h eB e n c h m a r km o d e lb yi n t r o d u c i n gaL u c a st y p ee x t e r n a l i t y
in the accumulation of human capital. In this new model, if the Social Planner is purely
utilitarist (ex-ante SWF), the Lucas-type externality implies that births have to be taxed
while education have to be subsidized as in Baudin [2010].13
When the SWF is ex-post, two eﬀects interact: (i)t h eL u c a s - t y p ee x t e r n a l i t yn e c e s s i t a t e s
11.The population is assumed to be large enough to make this approximation a precise one.
12.See, for instance, Galor and his co-authors [1999, 2005], De la Croix and Doepke [2003] and Lucas [1988].
13.With a purely utilitarist Social Planner, there is no diﬀerence between individual and social preferences.
Then, the only motive for implementing an economic policy is the Lucas type externality.
5to tax births and subsidize education and (ii)t h ep a r e n t a ls t r a t e g ya g a i n s tr i s ki sas o u r c e
of ineﬃciencies. If parents have a precautionary demand for children, they have too much
children what requires to tax births and to subsidize education. Then, overshooting reinforces
the impact of the Lucas-type externality. However, if parents undershoot their fertility rate,
they tend to have too little children such that births should be taxed. Then, the two main
eﬀects go in the opposite direction. As a result, if the Lucas type externality is strong,
the undershooting eﬀect is fully dominated by the externality eﬀect and it is optimal to
subsidize education and to tax births. Conversely, if the Lucas type externality is weak, the
undershooting eﬀect fully dominates the externality eﬀect and it is optimal to tax education
and to subsidize births. For intermediary intensities of the educational externality, it becomes
optimal to subsidize both births and education.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the laissez-faire equi-
librium and determines the conditions under which parents have a precautionary demand
for children. Section 3 describes the social optimum while Section 4 determines the optimal
economic policy. Then, I extend the model to positive externalities of human capital in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2C o m p e t i t i v e E q u i l i b r i u m a n d P r e c a u t i o n a r y D e m a n d
For Children
In this section, I ﬁrst present the model economy and its competitive equilibrium. Then,
Is h o wt h a t ,f a c i n gu n c e r t a i n t ya b o u tt h e i rc h i l d r e ns u r v i v a lt oa d u l t h o o d ,p a r e n t sd o n ’ t
always have a precautionary demand for children.
2.1 The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
The model consists of an overlapping generations economy with Lt adult agents. Each agent
can live potentially two periods: childhood and adulthood. As in Lagerlof [2003], Baland and
Esteban [2006] and Erlich and Lui [1991], each child has a probability qt to reach adulthood.
This probability is assumed to be exogenous. Children do not consume commodities but
receive education from their parent. This educational investment is denoted et,i ti n c r e a s e s
the children’s future human capital ht+1 if he or she becomes adult. The accumulation of
6human capital follows a standard process:
ht+1 = f(et,h t) (1)
Function f is strictly increasing and concave with respect to all its arguments. I assume non
increasing returns to scale. An intrafamily transmission of human capital takes place: the
parental human capital ht positively inﬂuences the future human capital of children. This is
a quality eﬀect of the schooling time.
When a child born in t−1 reaches adulthood, he has to decide his consumption level ct,
the number of his children Nt and their education et.N o t i c et h a tp a r e n t sd e c i d et h e i rn u m b e r
of births Nt but not their number of surviving children nt ≤ Nt that is a random variable.
In line with Sah [1991] and Kalemli-Ozcan [2003], nt follows a binomial distribution. The








t (1 − qt)
Nt−nt (2)
where qt is the probability for each child to survive to adulthood. Because the law of large
numbers applies and agents are identical, the population’s law of motion is simply:
Lt+1 = qtNtLt (3)
For simplicity’s sake, families are mono-parental. The familial budget constraint is:
ct = [1 − (φ + θet)Nt]wtht (4)
where (φ,θ) ∈]0,1[2 denote respectively the fraction of the parent’s time endowment (nor-
malized to one) that is needed to rear one child and the time cost of one unit of education.
The total opportunity cost to have Nt children is then equal to (φ + θet)wthtNt where wt is
the wage rate per eﬀective worker. The cost of one unit of education isn’t aﬀected by the
child mortality rate since a child death is assumed to occur after the education process.14
14.In a more general framework, I should also include child mortality in addition to young adult mortality.
To do so, I should introduce the probability for a child to die before age ﬁve. In this case, the child mortality
would aﬀect the cost of education since education is provided after age ﬁve. Doing so would not alter my
main result if I assumed, as in Baudin [2010], that child mortality isn’t a source of uncertainty what is a
reasonable assumption.
7The ﬁnal good is produced in quantity Yt following a linear technology:
Yt = AHt (5)
A is a productivity factor and Ht is the total amount of human capital in the workforce. At
the labor market’s equilibrium, Ht is:
Ht = [1 − (φ + θet)Nt]htLt (6)
The workforce participation of a parent consists of his remaining time after childbearing and
educating his or her children. Furthermore, as the labor market is competitive, the wage
equals the workers’ marginal productivity at each date t:
wt = A (7)
As in Razin and Ben Zion [1975], parents are altruistic toward their children such that their
preferences are dynastic. Let Vt denote the maximal expected utility of an adult born in





j(nt,N t,q t)u(ct,n t)+βVt+1
￿
(8)
where u(ct,n t) is the current utility of the representative parent having nt surviving children.
β denotes the parental discount rate. u(.,.) is strictly increasing and concave in its argu-
ments. In this representation à la Razin and Ben Zion, I assume that parent’s utility from
consumption is separable from her child’s lifetime utility but not from her fertility choice.16
Parents value the number of surviving children, this means that child mortality is a source
of disutility. Because child survival is uncertain, parents have to maximize their expected
utility.
Ia s s u m et h a tp a r e n t sa r ec h a r a c t e r i z e db yr a t i o n a le x p e c t a t i o n s . Et−i(gt) denotes the
15.In the model of Razin and Ben Zion, there is no uncertainty about the number of surviving children.
Then, the parental utility function is Ψt = max{u(ct,n t)+βΨt+1}. In the present paper, Vt consists of an
adaptation of this utility function to uncertain child survival.
16.Alternatively, I could assume, as in Barro and Becker [1988], that fertility choice is not separable from
the child’s lifetime utility while it is from the parent’s consumption. This alternative has been widely used
in the literature. Nerlove and Rault [1997] show that, in fact, the Barro and Becker’s model, as well as
the model designed by Razin and Ben Zion, are speciﬁc cases of a more general model. They present this
more general model where, sidestepping uncertainty, Vt = max{u(ct,n t)+β (nt)ntVt+1}. In the Becker and
Barro speciﬁcation, u￿
nt =0while in the Razin and Ben Zion model, ntβ (nt)=β. Jones and Schoonbroodt
[2009] and Bar and Leukhina [2010] show that for some joint restrictions on β(nt) and u(ct,n t),b o t hm o d e l s
are identical.
8expectation of gt at date (t − i). The assumption of rational expectations implies that
Et−i(nt)=qtNt and Et−i(nt −qtNt)2 = qt(1−qt)Nt.F u r t h e r m o r e ,p a r e n t a le x p e c t a t i o n sa r e
assumed to be perfectly observable by the Social Planner and the government. Iterating Vt








j(ns,N s,q s)u(cs,n s) (9)
As in Kalemli-Ozcan [2003], I approximate the parental current utility around the mean of
the binomial distribution thanks to Taylor series.18 At h i r dd e g r e ea p p r o x i m a t i o na r o u n d










nt (ct,q tNt) denotes the νth derivative of u(ct,n t) with respect to nt evaluated at the
point qtNt and u
(0)
nt (ct,q tNt)=u(ct,q tNt).F o r s i m p l i c i t y ’ s s a k e , I a s s u m e t h a t f o u r t h a n d
higher order terms are negligible what is a reasonable assumption. Because of the parental
rational expectations, Et−i(nt −qtNt)ν =0∀ν ∈{ 2n+1;n ∈ N} and Et(nt+i −qt+iNt+i)2 =
qt+i(1 − qt+i)Nt+i is the variance of the binomial.19 Therefore, the maximal expected utility















17.A necessary condition to obtain such an equivalence is: limT→+∞ βT ￿NT
nT=0 j(nT,N T,q T)u(cT,n T)=
0.n T being the number of surviving children, it is bounded by 1
φ the maximal number of children a wife can
give birth to. So, this condition will always be satisﬁed when income and so consumption are bounded at
the steady state what will be the case in the rest of the paper. Indeed, in this case, the expected utility of a
parent is also bounded.
18.Notice that Sah [1991] also assumes binomial distributions but doesn’t proposes approximations with
Taylor series.
19.From now, n is being used to denote the number of surviving children that is no more a natural number.
20.Here again, the objective function is bounded. Indeed, qt ∈ [0,1].N o t i c et h a t ,b e c a u s eIf o c u so nt h e
mortality of young adults, there is no uncertainty about consumption levels. Indeed, the costs of surviving
and non surviving children are the same such that, the consumption of parents do not depend on the number
of surviving children which is random. If I had assume child mortality, at age ﬁve, as a source of uncertainty,
the true approximation of the expected parental current utility would have been:



























9As mentioned by Kalemli-Ozcan [2003], this approximation allows to introduce a risk eﬀect




ntnt(ct,q tNt) is the total
utility loss of a risk-averse parent born in t−1 due to the uncertainty about child survival.21












nsns(cs,q sNs)+ηs (f(es,h s) − hs+1)
￿
(14)
where ηs is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the accumulation of human capital at each
date s.Ap a r e n tb o r ni nt−1 will determine his optimal demands (ct,N t,e t)b ym a x i m i z i n g
(14)s u b s t i t u t i n gct by its expression in (4). Thus, I obtain the three following ﬁrst-order




































































equations {(1),(4) − (7),(15) − (17)}
t=+∞
t=0 .23
In the following sub-section, I explore the conditions that have to be satisﬁed to observe
ap r e c a u t i o n a r yd e m a n df o rc h i l d r e n .
21.The main reason why I didn’t adopt the Barro and Becker [1988]’s representation of preferences is that
such an approximation would not be tractable. Indeed, adopting this alternative representation of preferences














with κ ∈ [0,1] when u(ct) > 0 ∀ct > 0 and κ>1 when u(ct) < 0 ∀ct > 0 (see Jones and Schoonbroodt
[2007]). Using a third degree approximation around the mean of the binomial wouldn’t introduce a risk
eﬀect (the variance) in a tractable way.
22.To ensure global concavity of the problem, its Hessian Matrix is assumed to be negative semi-deﬁnite.















102.2 Do parents always overshoot their optimal fertility rate?
Deﬁnition 1 Parents overshoot their number of children (i.e.: they have a precautionary
demand for children) if facing uncertainty about their reproductive success, they decide to
give births to more children than optimal in an environment without uncertainty. Conversely,
parents will undershoot their number of children if they decide to give births to less children.
Proposition 1 Facing uncertainty about the number of children who will survive to adult-
















nnn ∀u(ct,n t) at the steady state
When this condition isn’t satisﬁed, parents undershoot their number of children.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In presence of uncertainty about their reproductive success, parents have a precautionary
demand for children (hoarding) only if an additional birth reduces their utility loss coming





It is easy to show that such a condition is not always satisﬁed when parental preferences
are separable between consumption and fertility. Under a log-linear speciﬁcation of prefer-
ences as in Kalemli-Ozcan [2003,2008], an additional birth reduces the parental loss coming
from their risk aversion. Indeed, assume that u(ct,n t)=αlnct +γ lnnt. The ﬁrst condition
in proposition 1 reduces to 2 > 1.O b v i o u s l y , t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s a l w a y s s a t i s ﬁ e d .H o w e v e r ,
for u(ct,n t)=v(ct)+n
β
t + nt(Bnt + C) with β ∈]0,1[, B<0 and C>−[βφβ−1 + 2B
φ ],t h e
ﬁrst condition in proposition 1 is no more satisﬁed ∀B<−
β(β−1)2
2φβ−2 which means that parents
undershoot their optimal number of children.25
24.This term is simply equal to the variance of the binomial times a loss term coming from the risk aversion
of parents since u￿￿



















Notice that this reasoning is not valid for non-separable utility functions out of the steady state. Following
Leland [1968] and Kimball [1990], parents can be deﬁned as prudent if they have a precautionary demand
for children. It is clear that in an endogenous fertility problem, the usual condition u￿￿￿ > 0 is not suﬃcient
to observe prudent behavior. See for instance Langlais [1995] for a similar result about the risk on interest
rate.
25.Indeed in this case, the overshooting condition reduces to β(β −1)2n
β−2





11It is also straightforward that the second condition of proposition 1 is not always satisﬁed.
Once again, adopting a log-linear utility function implies that parents have a precautionary
demand for children. However, adopting a utility function with a constant elasticity of











α>1.I t i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n c a n n e v e r b e f u l ﬁ l l e d ∀α>2.26 In this
case, the loss in term of utility due to risk aversion increases when parents decide to have an
additional child.
In the present model, I assume that there is no externality. Intuitively, it should imply
that the ﬁrst best optimum is identical to the laissez-faire equilibrium. However this will
be true only if the Social Planner is purely utilitarist and, when population is endogenous,
assuming a purely utilitarist Social Planner is far from being the unique option.
3T h e S o c i a l O p t i m u m
When the size of the population is endogenous, deﬁning the SWF is not straightforward. For
instance, as shown by Nerlove and al [1986], adopting either a Millian SWF or a Benthamite
SWF leads to very diﬀerent recommendations of economic policy. In the present paper, I
focus on "Millian-type" SWF in the sense that the Social Planner will always try to maximize
individual utility rather than total utility.27
However, under uncertain child survival, the problem of the "timing eﬀect" has to be
explored. I analyze two polar cases. First, the SWF coincides with the expected utility
of the representative agent displayed in (9). In this case, the SWF is ex-ante.I n o t h e r
words, the Social Planner is purely utilitarist and so fully concerned with uncertainty at the
individual level. Therefore, the SWF results from the aggregation of individual preferences
which seems to be reasonable. In this case, overshooting as well as undershooting are not a
source of ineﬃciency.
In the second polar case, the SWF consists of the ex-post SWF. In this case, the SWF
doesn’t equal the individual expected utility but the utility of the expected realization of





































This is impossible when α>2.F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s α<2 such that the
second condition of proposition 1 isn’t satisﬁed.
27.See Baudin [2010] for a discussion on the optimality properties of the Razin and Ben-Zion’s model with
non-Millian Social Welfare Functions and certainty about the parental reproductive success.
12nt. Because the law of large numbers does apply here, the Social Planner knows the average
number of surviving children with almost certainty for each date t,a n dm a x i m i z e st h e
utility derived from this realization. In other words, individual utility is evaluated after the
resolution of uncertainty and the Social Planner can be considered as risk neutral. In this
case, the individual precautionary demand for children is a source of ineﬃciency since all
parents make more children than what is optimal without uncertainty, and so they don’t
allocate enough wealth to both consumption and education. In the same way, undershooting
is also a source of ineﬃciency since parents allocate too much resource to both consumption
and education.28
Note that, in these two polar cases, the Social Planner is not concerned with inequalities
and that nothing ensures that ex-post one of these SWF always provides more utility per se
or more total utility than the other. I propose the following SWF that allows to represent















with i = {0,1}. µi allows me to take the timing-eﬀect into account. I assume µ1 =1what
makes the SWF coincide with the ex-ante SWF. In this case, (21)i sd i r e c t l yd e d u c e df r o m
(9)u s i n gt h es a m ea p p r o x i m a t i o na si nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n .A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,Ia s s u m eµ0 =0 .
It makes the SWF coincide with the ex-post SWF.29,30
The resource constraint of the economy implies that total consumption equals total pro-
duction such that:
Lt [ct + φAhtNt + θAhtNtet]=AhtLt (22)
28.Note that because child survival is subject to uncertainty, nothing ensures that the social optimum
dominates the laissez-faire equilibrium in the sense of A and P eﬃciency (see Golosov et al [2007]). Indeed,
even when the Social Planner is assumed to be ex-post, he cannot predict individual realization of risk.
Furthermore, he or she has no instrument to ensure agents against risk since children are not an exchangeable
good.
29.Gajdos and Maurin [2004] propose an axiomatic that deﬁnes a class of SWF which lie strictly between
the ex-ante and the ex-post SWF. Here, nothing ensures that a SWF with µi taking intermediary values
between zero and one would respect this axiomatic. For this reason, I don’t explore the case of µi strictly
lying between zero and one.
30.The consistency of notations would require to index all endogenous variables with subscripts i but I
choose to delete them in order to make calculus more readable.
13Let LS














ntnt(ct,q tNt)+ηt (f(et,h t) − ht+1)
￿
(23)
where ηt denotes the Lagrange multiplier attached to the human capital accumulation process
at date t. The Social Planner has to maximize (23)s u b s t i t u t i n gct by its expression in (22).




















































Therefore, the Social Optimum is deﬁned as the set
￿







It is intuitive that the laissez-faire equilibrium coincides with the ﬁst best path when the
SWF is ex-ante. However, when this latter is ex-post,d e c e n t r a l i z e df e r t i l i t yd e c i s i o n sa r en o
more optimal since overshooting and undershooting are a source of social ineﬃciency.
4O n T h e O p t i m a l T a x - T r a n s f e r P o l i c y
To decentralize the social optimum, the government has to implement a public policy that








t=0 coincide with the social op-
timum {￿ ct, ￿ Nt,￿ et,￿ ht, ￿ Ht, ￿ Yt}
t=+∞
t=0 .
In this section, I characterize the optimal economic policy. I especially show that this
optimal policy is unique whatever the SWF that is chosen. Then, I analyze the properties
of this policy in the two polar cases: (i)t h eex-ante SWF and (ii)t h eex-post SWF. I show
31.Once again, to ensure global concavity of the problem, its Hessian Matrix is assumed

























14that the nature of the optimal economic policy is completely diﬀerent between these two
cases.
Deﬁnition 2 Let the set {λt,Λt,T t}
t=+∞
t=0 deﬁne an economic policy where λt > 0 (resp
λt < 0)c o n s i s t so ft h es u b s i d yr a t e( r e s pt a xr a t e )o ne d u c a t i o ns p e n d i n g ,Λt > 0 (resp
Λt < 0)d e n o t e st h es u b s i d y( r e s pt a x )o ne a c hc h i l db i r t ha n dTt ￿ 0 al u m ps u mt r a n s f e r .


















The parental budget constraint is now:
ct = wtht (1 − [φ − Λt +( 1− λt)θet]Nt)+Tt (29)












t=0 and the following ﬁrst-order conditions with respect





















































An optimal economic policy has to make the set {(24),(25),(26)}
t=+∞
t=0 identical to the set
{(31),(32),(33)}
t=+∞
t=0 .I n d e e d ,t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f (28) and (29) ensures that the resource
constraint is satisﬁed.
Proposition 2 Given that the Social Planner can observe the parental rational expectations
on the future tax and transfers {λt+1,Λt+1,T t+1}
t=+∞
t=0 ,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u ee c o n o m i cp o l i c y
{￿ λt, ￿ Λt, ￿ Tt}
t=+∞
t=0 that is able to decentralize the ﬁrst-best path for each µi:
33.Notice that, in this paper, family policies are limited to tax - transfer policies. In reality, family policies
include a large set of instruments like, for instance, coercive policies and preventive actions.















15• If the Social Planner is purely utilitarist (µi =1 ), the laissez-faire equilibrium coincides




• If the Social Planner is ex-post (µi =0 ), the optimal economic policy is described as
follows:
￿ λt = At￿ λt+1 + Gt (µi − 1) (34)
￿ Λt = −Jt￿ λt+1 + Rt (µi − 1) (35)
The optimal value ￿ Tt is directly deduced from the government budget constraint.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result shows that it is possible to decentralize the social optimum all along the
transition to the steady state even when the number of children surviving to adulthood is
uncertain. In accordance with the intuition, no economic policy is required when the Social
Planner is purely utilitarist. Indeed, with an ex-ante SWF, there exist no diﬀerence between
private and social preferences. Then, it is straightforward that, in absence of any externality
in the model, the ﬁrst best and the competitive equilibrium coincide.
However, when the Social Planner is ex-post,t h eo p t i m u ma n dt h ec o m p e t i t i v ee q u i l i b -
rium no more coincide. Indeed, in this case, the existence of a precautionary demand for
children as well as undershooting are a source of social ineﬃciency. The stationary values of





























































Remembering Proposition 1, ￿ Λ < 0 while ￿ λ>0 when parents overshoot their number of
children.35 Indeed, hoarding is now a source of ineﬃciency: risk aversion leads parents to have
more children than optimal. Then, births must be taxed and because the parental budget
constraint is non-linear, the government has to subsidize education. Indeed, when parents
invest in their children’s human capital, they increase the future quantity cost of grand-
children that is φwt+1ht+1Nt+1 what ﬁnally lowers the returns to educational investment.
35.￿b
x denotes the elasticity of b with respect to x. ￿
f
2 < 1 by assumption
16When the tax on births is implemented, the cost becomes (φ − Λt+1)wt+1ht+1Nt+1 with
Λt+1 < 0. Then the returns to the investment in education is decreased below its optimal
level and so, it is optimal to subsidize education in order to compensate for this distortion
created by the economic policy.
Conversely, if parents undershoot their optimal number of children, ￿ Λ > 0 while ￿ λ<0.I n
this case, parents protect themselves from risk by having less children than socially optimal.
The government has to subsidize births and because the parental budget constraint is not
linear, education has to be taxed.
It is intuitive that this result becomes crucial when positive externalities are introduced in
the process of human capital accumulation. Indeed, in the case of an ex-post SWF, the eﬀect
of undershooting could dominate the usual impact of positive externalities of education. The
next section discusses this issue.
5A S i m p l e E x t e n s i o n T o E d u c a t i o n a l E x t e r n a l i t i e s
Al a r g em a j o r i t yo ft h el i t e r a t u r ea s s u m e st h a tt h e r ee x i s ts o m ee x t e r n a l i t i e si nt h ep r o -
duction of human capital. Introducing this kind of externalities is crucial to discuss the
optimality conditions in the models of trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity. Intuitively,
the existence of uncertainty about child survival to adulthood could be crucial to determine
the nature of the optimal economic policies as well as the optimal response to a mortality
crisis. Human capital is now produced thanks to the following process:
ht+1 = f(et,h t,ht) (38)
Function f is strictly increasing and concave with respect to all its arguments, it is close
to the De la Croix and Doepke [2003]’s production function of human capital. I assume
non increasing returns to scale. In addition to previous inputs, there exists a Lucas’ type
aggregate externality in the sense that the average level of human capital in the population
ht has a positive impact on the children’s future human capital. This assumption is in line,
among others, with Lucas [1988] and De la Croix and Doepke [2003]. Therefore, parents
don’t internalize that their children’s human capital aﬀects the production of human capital
of other people’s grandchildren (ht+2 = f[et+1,h t+1,ht+1]).
Iu s ee x a c t l yt h es a m em e t h o da si ns e c t i o n s3t o6i no r d e rt od e t e r m i n et h ec o m p e t i t i v e
equilibrium, the ﬁrst best path and the optimal economic policy. It is straightforward that
the only diﬀerence between the alternative cases is that the Social Planner takes into account
17all the returns of his investment in human capital while parents don’t take into account the
Lucas type externality. Then ceteris paribus, parents should tend to underinvest in their
children’s quality.
Proposition 3 Given that the Social Planner can observe the parental rational expectations
on the future tax and transfers {λt+1,Λt+1,T t+1}
t=+∞
t=0 ,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u ee c o n o m i cp o l i c y
{￿ λt, ￿ Λt, ￿ Tt}
t=+∞
t=0 that is able to decentralize the ﬁrst-best path whatever the risk aversion of
the Social Planner. This optimal economic policy is described as follows:
￿ λt = At￿ λt+1 + Dt￿
f(et+1,ht,ht)
3 + Gt (µi − 1) (39)
￿ Λt = −Jt￿ λt+1 −L t￿
f(et+1,ht,ht)
3 + Rt (µi − 1) (40)
The optimal value ￿ Tt is directly deduced from the government budget constraint.
Proof. See Appendix C.





































































In the following subsections, I discuss the properties of this optimal economic policy at the
steady state in the two polar cases: ex-ante and ex-post SWF.
5.1 Ex-Ante Social Welfare Function, µi =1
Once again, when the Social Planner is purely utilitarist, there is no diﬀerence between the
individual welfare function and the SWF and so, uncertainty and risk aversion has no role to
play in the design of the optimal economic policy.36 At the steady state, the optimal values
















36.This is in line with the ﬁrst case in Proposition 2. Obviously, because the degree of risk-aversion has an
impact on the optimal values of individual and social choices, it has an impact on the magnitude of both ￿ λ
and ￿ Λ but not on their sign.
18The optimal economic policy consists of subsidizing the parental investments in education
and taxing births. This result crucially comes from both the Lucas-type externality and
the non-linearity of the parental budget constraint.37 Because of the Lucas-type externality,
parents don’t take into account all the returns of their investment in their children’s human
capital. Therefore, they tend to underinvest in the quality of children. This ineﬃciency has
to be corrected by the implementation of a subsidy on education. However, the subsidy on
education spending also reduces the marginal cost of the quantity of children that becomes
φwtht +( 1− λt)θwthtet.I t i m p l i e s t h a t p a r e n t s h a v e t o o m u c h c h i l d r e n . 38 This has to
be corrected by the implementation of a tax on each child birth. The non-linearity of the
parental budget constraint implies that three instruments are needed to correct the only
Lucas-type externality.
Importantly, the nature of the optimal economic policy won’t be modiﬁed by the ap-
parition of a mortality crisis. When a mortality crisis appears,39 parents engage either in
overshooting or in undershooting what is socially optimal. Then, the only diﬀerence between
the ﬁrst best and the competitive equilibrium still consists in the Lucas type externality which
requires to subsidize education and to tax births.
5.2 Ex-Post Social Welfare Function, µi =0
With an ex-post SWF, two main eﬀects interact: (i)t h eL u c a st y p ee x t e r n a l i t yt h a tm a k e s
parents underinvest in their children’s human capital and (ii)t h eu n d e r s h o o t i n g( r e s p .o v e r -
shooting) that makes parents having too little (resp. too many) children at the competitive
equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal economic policy will be determined by the respective
magnitude of these two eﬀects. Formally, the optimal values of (￿ λ, ￿ Λ) are displayed in equa-
tions (41)a n d( 42) with µi =0 .
37.It generalizes Baudin [2010] who ﬁnds the same result in a Millian framework without uncertainty on
the child survival to adulthood.
38.Parents could also have a too low number of children if after the reduction in the cost of both quality
and quantity, they reduce their fertility. See Willis [1973] and Jones and Schoonbroodt [2007] for a discussion
of this point.




















































Proposition 4 When parents formulate a precautionary demand for children, the optimal
economic policy always consists of taxing births and subsidizing education. When parents
undershoot their number of children, the optimal economic policy consists of:
• as u b s i d yo ne d u c a t i o na n dat a xo nb i r t h sw h e n￿
f
3 > Z
• as u b s i d yo nb o t he d u c a t i o na n db i r t h sw h e n￿
f
3 ∈ [W,Z]
• at a xo ne d u c a t i o na n das u b s i d yo nb i r t h sw h e n￿
f
3 < W
Proof. See Appendix D.
The interpretation of this result is very intuitive. When parents overshoot their optimal
number of children, the two main eﬀects reinforce each other: (i)b e c a u s eo ft h eL u c a s
type externality, education has to be subsidized and births have to be taxed, (ii)b e c a u s e
the parental precautionary demand for children is a source of ineﬃciency, births must be
taxed and education subsidized. Therefore, when parents have a precautionary demand for
children, it is always optimal to subsidize education and to tax births.
However, when parents undershoot their number of children, the nature of the optimal
economic policy can be radically diﬀerent. Indeed, the two main eﬀects go in the opposite
direction: (i)b e c a u s eo ft h eL u c a st y p ee x t e r n a l i t y ,e d u c a t i o nh a st ob es u b s i d i z e da n d
births have to be taxed while (ii)b e c a u s er i s ka v e r s ep a r e n t sp r o t e c tt h e m s e l v e sf r o mr i s k
by having less children than socially optimal, births have to be subsidized and education must
be taxed. As a result, if the Lucas-type externality is weak relative to the "undershooting
eﬀect" (￿
f
3 < W), it is optimal to subsidize births and to tax education. For intermediary
intensities of the Lucas-type externality (￿
f
3 ∈ [W,Z]), the optimal economic policy consists
of subsidizing both births and education. Obviously, for strong intensities of the externality
(￿
f
3 > Z), it is optimal to subsidize education and to tax births as in the case of overshooting.
With an ex-post SWF, the nature of the optimal economic policy can be profoundly
altered by the apparition of a mortality crisis. This can easily be understood in the light
20of a comparison between the optimal economic policies when q =1and when q<1.40
When the mortality rate is zero (q =1 ), parents behave as in a certain environment and the
optimal economic policy consists of subsidizing education and taxing births because of the
Lucas-type externality (see equations (36)a n d( 37)). When the mortality crisis does appear,
parents can either engage in overshooting or undershooting what is socially ineﬃcient.
On the one hand, if parents engage in overshooting, the need to tax births and to sub-
sidize education is reinforced.41 On the other hand, if parents undershoot their number
of children, the optimal government’s response can be more surprising. Indeed, if parents
strongly undershoot their fertility when the mortality crisis takes place, the "undershooting
eﬀect" can fully dominate the Lucas type externality. It would imply that education has
to be taxed and births must be subsidized. This case arises only if, after the decrease in q,
￿
f
3 < W. If the "undershooting eﬀect" is less intense (￿
f
3 ∈ [W,Z]), the optimal modiﬁcation
of the economic policy is to subsidize births instead of taxing it and to keep subsidizing edu-
cational investments. Indeed, in this case, the "undershooting eﬀect" doesn’t fully dominate
the Lucas-type externality.42
6C o n c l u s i o n
The present paper investigates the impact of uncertain child survival to adulthood on both
individual fertility rates and the optimal economic policy. I especially show that facing this
uncertainty, parents don’t always formulate a precautionary demand for children . I also
show that overshooting as well as undershooting become a source of ineﬃciency when social
welfare is evaluated after the resolution of uncertainty. It is then optimal to tax births and
to subsidize investments in education when parents overshoot their fertility rate. Conversely,
40.As mentioned by Kalemli-Ozcan [2003], mortality rates never go beyond one half that is the mortality
rate implying the highest variance in the number of surviving children.
41.Obviously, the net impact of this change on both ￿ Λ and ￿ λ depends on the modiﬁcation of the parental














































Nevertheless, ￿ Λ will always remain negative and ￿ λ positive.
42.In this section, I discuss the impact of the emergence of a mortality crisis in two polar cases: the ex-ante
SWF and the ex-post SWF. Obviously, admitting that the SWF is either strictly ex-ante or strictly ex-post
is a simpliﬁcation of a more general case where it is a mix of these two polar cases. Intuitively, in this
case, the existence of either a precautionary demand for children or undershooting would remain a source of
ineﬃciency that has to be corrected thanks to distortive taxes.
21it becomes optimal to subsidize births and to tax education when parents undershoot their
fertility rate. Introducing positive externalities in the accumulation of human capital can
partially alter this result.
To extend these results, future research should explore two problems: (i)t h ed e ﬁ n i t i o no f
conditions under which parents have a precautionary demand for children out of the steady
state in a framework where their utility function is non-separable and (ii)t h ec o n s i d e r a t i o n
of the old-age support motive for child births in developing countries.
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From equations (16)a n d( 17), it is straightforward that under the assumption of sepa-
rable preferences, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to et and ht+1 are not aﬀected by
uncertainty. Therefore, the marginal net utility of an additional birth for a parent born in
t − 1 can easily be calculated by diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to Nt. This yields:
∂Lt
∂Nt

















When parents determine their optimal fertility rate, ∂Lt
∂Nt =0 .L e tNU denote this optimal
fertility rate. Parents will have a precautionary demand for children if their fertility rate
is higher than what would be optimal in an environment without uncertainty. In such an
environment, the optimal fertility rate Nrl solves
∂Lrl
t





Recalling that both problems are globally concave, if
∂Lrl
t
∂Nt < 0,p a r e n t sh a v em o r ec h i l d r e n






















This implies that ∂Lt
∂Nt =0if and only if
∂Lrl
t
∂Nt = −Xt.W h e n Xt > 0,
∂Lrl
t
∂Nt <0 and so
NU >N rl: parents have a precautionary demand for children. Conversely, if Xt < 0,
NU <N rl meaning that parents undershoot their optimal number of children.
Steady State
The combination of the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to et and ht+1 implies that
the optimal decisions of parents on (Nt,e t)h a v et os a t i s f y( 15)a tt h es t e a d ys t a t ea n dt h e
following condition:








Finally, this condition doesn’t depend on the parental risk aversion. Then, using the same
method as for proposition 1, I obtain that the marginal net utility of an additional birth
43.Where Lrl
t denotes the Lagrangian of the parental maximization problem without uncertainty.
26when child survival is uncertain, is:
∂Lt
∂Nt







































.U s i n gt h es a m em e t h o da si nt h ep r e v i o u s
case, it is straightforward that parents have a precautionary demand for children when T > 0


































t=0 ,i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r -
ward that the set {￿ λt, ￿ Λt}
t=+∞
t=0 has to ensure that at each date t,t h eﬁ r s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n s
with respect to Nt,e t and ht+1 at the competitive equilibrium are identical to the these at








































































Equations (.51) and (.52) characterize a system of two equations with two unknowns which
are {λt,Λt} given the parental rational expectation on {λt+1,Λt+1}. This system is linear
with regards to its unknowns and so, it is straightforward that it admits a unique solution.
Two cases have to be considered: (i) µi =1and (ii) µi =0 .
• µi =1 :I ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt h a tt h es o l u t i o nt ot h es y s t e mi s{λt,Λt} = {0,0}. This
is satisﬁed ∀t.
27• µi =0 :Ic a nd i s p l a y{λt,Λt} as linear functions of λt+1 and Λt+1 such that:
￿ λt = At￿ λt+1 + Gt (µi − 1) (.53)
















































It is straightforward to deﬁne the competitive equilibrium as well as the social optimum
since the unique diﬀerence between the two models consists in the human capital
accumulation process.










satisfying equations {(38),(4) − (7),(15) − (17)}
t=+∞
t=0 .44
The Social Optimum:I ti sn o wd e ﬁ n e da st h es e t
￿






t=0 and the following ﬁrst-order condition






















Then, I introduce the same economic policy as in the benchmark model: {λt,Λt,T t}
+∞
t=0
and I use the same method as in section 5. I obtain:
￿ λt = At￿ λt+1 + Dt￿
f(et+1,ht,ht)
3 + Gt (µi − 1) (.56)
￿ Λt = −Jt￿ λt+1 −L t￿
f(et+1,ht,ht)
3 + Rt (µi − 1) (.57)











From (41), (42)a n dD e ﬁ n i t i o n3 ,i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt h a t :
￿ λ>0 ⇐⇒ ￿
f
3 > W (.58)
￿ Λ > 0 ⇐⇒ ￿
f
3 > Z (.59)
From proposition 1, I know that (W,Z) < (0,0) if parents overshoot their optimal
number of children. Because ￿
f(et+1,ht,ht)
3 > 0,i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt h a t(￿ λ, ￿ Λ) > (0,0)
when parents have a precautionary demand for children.
From proposition 1, I know that (W,Z) > (0,0) if parents undershoot their optimal
number of children. After some straightforward calculus, it appears that W < Z is






2 > 0 (.60)
This is always satisﬁed. Then, when parents undershoot their optimal number of
children, W < Z.
From conditions (.58) and (.59),i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt h a ti ti so p t i m a lt o :
– tax education and subsidize births when ￿
f
3 < W
– subsidize both education and births when Z >￿
f
3 > W
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